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Abstract 
More than twenty years after the fall of the iron curtain, do citizens from former Communist 
countries still exhibit attitudes and preferences with regard to the welfare state and income 
redistribution that differ from those in the West? This paper seeks to answer this question for 
Germany after reunification using not only survey data on attitudes but also evidence on 
preferences from a discrete choice experiment, both based on a representative sample. In a 
first step, we revisit the empirical evidence, compare our results to those of Alesina and 
Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) and test whether convergence of attitudes has yet been achieved. In 
a second step, we apply an advanced method to investigate preferences for redistribution in 
terms of willingness to pay. This framework is more in line with standard public choice theo-
ry as individuals are forced to overcome trade-offs and are exposed to take their inherent 
budget constraint into account when voicing their opinion on redistribution. The results are 
quite mixed. While East Germans seem to desire a higher amount of redistribution than West 
Germans, they are not willing to contribute more through taxation. This finding has im-
portant implications for social policy in reunified Germany.  
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1 Introduction  
Twenty years after the fall of the iron curtain, ideological differences between the two former-
ly separated parts of Europe may continue to prevail. Socialist countries were characterized 
by proclaimed equality of all citizens and government responsibility for their well-being com-
bined with control. Even those who did not identify with this ideology are likely to have atti-
tudes towards the welfare state and income redistribution shaped by socialization. German 
reunification constitutes a case of particular interest for two reasons. First, reunification ex-
posed individuals from (former Communist) Eastern Germany much more directly and deeply 
to Western values than citizens of other Eastern European countries. Therefore, one might 
also expect a gradual convergence of their attitudes and preferences with regard to the welfare 
state and its correlate, income redistribution. Second, failing convergence German social poli-
cy would face the specific problem of having to deal with preference heterogeneity not only 
between rich and poor, the active and retired, but also between its Eastern and Western part of 
the country. To answer this question we use a unique representative dataset from 2012 based 
on survey data complemented with data from a discrete choice experiment. Thereby we focus 
on redistribution as one particular dimension of the welfare state. 
Differences in attitudes towards the welfare state between countries are well documented (see 
for example Alesina and Glaeser 2004 or Alesina et al. 2001). For instance, Europeans are 
found to show more support of the welfare state than U.S. citizens; however their attitudes are 
heterogeneous. According to recent literature, attitudes vary between former socialist coun-
tries and western market economies (see Luttmer and Singhal 2011). In this context, the de-
terminants of these differences such as ideology, culture and the effect of institutions on indi-
viduals’ attitudes are critically discussed. 
From a theoretical perspective Benabou and Tirole (2006) as well as Alesina and Angeletos 
(2005) suggest that the relationship between collective beliefs – i.e. views about fairness and 
an acceptable degree of inequality – and public welfare can lead to multiple equilibria. Alesi-
na et al. (2012) model individuals’ perceptions of inequality and justice within the framework 
of a probabilistic voting model. Their results indicate strong and long-lasting effects of these 
perceptions on individuals’ attitudes and voting behavior.  
Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) conducted an experiment in 1995 involving participants from 
both the former (Communist) German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the (western) Federal 
Republic of Germany. They find East Germans more inclined towards cooperation and soli-
darity than their Western compatriots.5 They relate this difference to differences in their cul-
tural background. 
The evidence presented so far suggests a strong effect of collective beliefs, norms, and culture 
on individuals’ attitudes. There are also several empirical studies, analyzing the role of these 
factors. Using three waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) covering 32 countries, 
Luttmer and Singhal (2011) investigate whether immigrants take their attitudes from their 
                                                 
5 To improve the readability of the article, people living in the area of the former German Democratic Republic 
are identified as East Germans, people living in the area of the cold-war Federal Republic of Germany are identi-
fied as West Germans. 
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country of origin with them. By focusing on immigrants, the authors are able to disentangle 
the (long-term) impact of culture from influences emanating from current economic and insti-
tutional influences.6 According to them, attitudes towards income redistribution are mainly 
affected by the cultural component. Moreover, the results indicate – in line with the theoreti-
cal literature – that this cultural component is long lasting and persistent even 20 years after 
immigration.  
Corneo and Grüner (2002), using the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) for 1992, 
compare attitudes towards redistribution in 12 countries. Separating former socialist and non-
socialist countries the authors can rule out that socialism has no effect on individuals’ atti-
tudes. In the contrary, they find striking differences. They find that individuals from countries 
with a socialist history exhibit stronger support for an active role of the state in reducing in-
come differences, as does Suhrcke (2001) based on ISSP data for 1999 as well as Guillaud 
(2012) based on the 2006 edition of ISSP. Thus, citizens from former socialist countries con-
sistently show a comparatively strong desire for redistribution even more than one and a half 
decades since the fall of the iron curtain. 
However, Olivera (2012) contradicts this finding, using data from the ESS covering the years 
2002 to 2010 and 33 European countries. He finds negative effects of a socialist past on indi-
viduals’ attitudes towards redistribution, leading him to conclude that attitudes instilled by 
Communist regimes have faded. Future studies will have to resolve this contradiction. 
One limitation of the studies cited up to this point is the use of cross country data which cate-
gorize very heterogeneous countries as east or west, respectively. But the former socialist 
countries have taken very different routes, some of them adapting to western principles and 
life-styles much faster than others. This aspect is taken into account e.g. by Corneo (2001) 
who focuses on the so-called east-west-dichotomy in only two countries, i.e. the differences in 
attitudes between U.S. citizens on the one hand and East and West Germans on the other. His 
results, based on ISSP data for 1992 again, indicate a marked inequality aversion of East 
Germans compared to West Germans and U.S. citizens, leading to a stronger desire for an 
active role of the state in reducing differences in income. 
More authors take advantage of the situation in Germany. German reunification provides an 
unique opportunity for testing the influence of ideology on attitudes. According to Alesina 
and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), German reunification can be treated as an exogenous shock. 
After World War II and the formation of the two German states in 1949, the separation of 
East and West Germany was increasingly enforced, culminating in the construction of the 
Berlin Wall in 1961. Up to 1989/90, East Germans could not cross the border and relocate, no 
matter what their preferences were. Especially in East Germany, the choice of the political 
and economic system was to a large extent no case of free will but of imposition. Hence, the 
residents of the two German states made entirely different experiences. East Germans had to 
live under a socialist regime that was characterized by Marxist and Leninist indoctrination of 
comprehensive equality and governmental responsibility for individuals’ well-being com-
bined with extensive control. Even individuals who did not identify with socialist ideology 
were subject to socialization shaping their attitudes towards the welfare state and its correlate, 
                                                 
6 Luttmer and Singhal (2011) also provide a broad literature review on the effects of culture on individuals’ atti-
tudes. 
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income redistribution. In contrast, West Germans were under the influence of a market econ-
omy and capitalism. This makes West Germans a perfect control group for East Germans. 
The first to benefit from this circumstance was Corneo (2004), who used German ISSP data 
for 1992 and 1999. He confirms earlier studies, finding that socialist ideology does have an 
impact on attitudes, with partial convergence between East and West during the period of ob-
servation, however. In their comprehensive analysis of citizens’ attitudes towards the welfare 
state and their determinants, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) rely on the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) covering the years 1997 and 2002 and ask whether there is a feed-
back effect of the political regime in East Germany on citizens’ attitudes. The authors concen-
trate on the question whether living under a socialist regime for 45 years leads to the belief 
that the type of government is essential for citizens’ well-being.7 
Having found evidence to this effect, the authors move on to examine determinants. An obvi-
ous one is political indoctrination; however, they also consider an economic one. Comparing 
income levels, East Germany was relatively poor in contrast to West Germany at the point of 
reunification. Thus, Eastern Germans are predicted to be in favor of redistribution in their 
own interest. However, even when controlling for individuals’ income, the effect of socialism 
still prevails, making East Germans more inclined to agree with the view that the political 
system is responsible for individual success while poverty is the fault of society. However, 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) continue their investigation on a more detailed level. 
First, they check whether individuals from East Germany who had lived there also in times of 
the former GDR show stronger support for government intervention than West Germans. In-
deed, they find that the probability of favoring intervention increases significantly if the indi-
vidual has experienced the Communist regime. However, this effect diminishes between 1997 
and 2002, resulting in convergence between 2009 and 2029, i.e. 20 to 40 years after reunifica-
tion. Second, the authors test for a relationship between the effect of Communism and the 
individual’s age. Overall, older age is associated with more entrenched attitudes, as one would 
expect, except that the second oldest cohort exhibits the strongest support for government 
intervention. Finally, individuals from East Germany who have migrated to the West have 
attitudes more in line with native West Germans than with the East Germans who stayed. 
These statements prove robust, leading the authors to conclude that the influence of Com-
munist ideology does not dependent of socio-demographic characteristics, among them also 
the federal state of residence. Using the same databases, Rainer and Siedler (2008) as well as 
Stichnoth (2012) find supporting evidence.  
Finally, Kuhn (2013) uses a slightly different framing which is close to this paper. Respond-
ents to the ISSP of the years 1987, 1992 and 1999 were asked to estimate wages earned in 
                                                 
7 The question Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) refer to reads: “At present, a multitude of social services are 
provided not only by the state but also by private free market enterprises, organizations, associations, or private 
citizens. What is your opinion on this? Who should be responsible for the following areas? […]” “financial 
security in case of unemployment,” “financial security in case of illness,” “financial security of families,” “fi-
nancial security for old-age,” and “financial security for persons needing care.” The respondents were forced to 
state their opinion on a five point scale with the orthogonal poles being “only the state” and “only private forc-
es”. The authors define the case in which the respondents choose “only the state” as having a strong preference 
for redistribution. The framing of the statement carries only a rather general notion of redistribution and probably 
captures perceptions about the general role of the state. Thus, it is not possible to disentangle views about the 
responsibility of the state from attitudes for redistribution. 
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several professions and to state how much people working in these professions should earn. 
Using the difference between these two values as a proxy for respondents’ demand for redis-
tribution, he finds this demand to be much stronger among East than West Germans. Moreo-
ver, the results underline previous findings of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) regarding 
differences in attitudes across birth cohorts, although not all effects turn out to be significant. 
Thus, Kuhn (2013) provides evidence that one reason for these differences are different ine-
quality perceptions of East and West Germans. 
To sum up the empirical literature, ideology seems to be a crucial determinant of individuals’ 
attitudes towards the welfare state and income redistribution, explaining much of the differ-
ence not only between former socialist countries and market economies but also between East 
and West Germany. Moreover, the results indicate a long-lasting effect of ideology on indi-
viduals’ attitudes. However, the cross country study by Olivera with data from 2010 suggests 
that there may be at least some convergence. The latest available data for Germany applied in 
a study are from the year 2005 (see Rainer and Siedler 2008). Since then, attitudes of East and 
West Germans may have converged, as Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) predict on the 
basis of data from 1997 and 2002. They mention the year 2009 as a lower bound for conver-
gence. But at this point of time, this hypothesis has not been tested, as no up-to-date data has 
been available so far. We aim at closing this gap, providing evidence on the basis of data for 
Germany of 2012. 
In addition, this study addresses an important methodological weakness of the existing litera-
ture. They measure attitudes by drawing on a question such as, “To what extent do you agree 
or disagree with the statement, ‘It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differ-
ences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes’?” (for exam-
ple Alesina and La Ferrara 2005 or Corneo and Grüner 2000). Responses to questions of this 
type are typically interpreted as preference for redistribution. But from a microeconomic per-
spective, it seems questionable that this agreement reflects true preferences rather than pure 
attitudes. In the context of this article and in line with the micro-economic theory we define 
that an attitude refers to the optimum point, i.e. the optimum combination of different charac-
teristics, whereas preferences refer to the slope of the indifference curve in a given situation, 
i.e. the marginal rate of substitution between the characteristics that enter the utility function. 
We will discuss the technical aspects of this not purely terminological question in more detail 
in section two when the concept of discrete choice experiments (DCEs) is introduced and in 
section four when we interpret the results.  
At this point we just want to stress that attitudes and preferences do not have to be the same 
as individuals’ might desire a higher level of redistribution while at the same time not being 
willing to equally participate in the financing. Another common problem of methods that rely 
on respondents’ agreement with certain statements is that they are prone to bias. For example, 
social desirability may likely result in excessive generosity when no budget constraint is im-
posed (‘yeah-saying’). Summarizing, as long as respondents are not exposed to a budget con-
straint and therefore are not forced to face trade-offs when voicing their opinion about the 
level of redistribution the outcome should not be interpreted in terms of a preference. They 
have therefore limited relevance for predicting actual decision making. Distortions of this 
type may cause policy makers to come up with proposals that fail the market test in the politi-
cal arena. Rational voters will consider the price they have to pay and the benefit they stand to 
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receive, respectively, depending on their position in the income distribution. Reforms of the 
welfare state need to be aligned with citizens’ preferences which ultimately are expressed in 
willingness-to-pay values.  
Studies going beyond survey-based measures of attitudes towards redistribution are extremely 
rare. Although redistribution is modeled as the result of a voting mechanism in standard pub-
lic choice theory, empirical analyses at the micro level fail to account for this. Accordingly, 
the typical framing of questions is inadequate for eliciting respondents’ preferences for redis-
tribution (see e.g. Fong 2006).8 
With the exception of Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a; 2010b), Neustadt (2011) and Pfarr (2012; 
2013), there are no studies estimating the preferences for redistribution using a DCE. Pfarr 
finds that the average German citizen is willing to contribute about 12 € per month for an in-
crease in the redistribution budget by one percentage point of GDP. The present contribution 
aims at testing the hypothesis, derived from the literature cited, that this WTP value is higher 
among East Germans than West Germans.  
Hence, the contribution of this study is twofold. First, more than 22 years after the German 
reunification, it addresses differences in attitudes towards the welfare state and income redis-
tribution between East and West Germans, contributing to the research on the effects of cul-
ture and ideology and distinguishing between individuals’ attitudes and preferences. Using the 
same methodology but data from a representative survey of 2012, estimated attitudes and their 
persistence can be compared to those found by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007). Second, 
the paper aims at measuring, for the first time, preferences for redistribution in East and West 
Germany using a DCE, involving 1,538 representatively selected German citizens in 2012. 
This permits to see whether attitudes towards the welfare state and preferences in terms of 
willing-to-pay values coincide. The insights obtained may help policy makers in unified Ger-
many to take into account preference heterogeneity between the Eastern and Western parts of 
the country when proposing reforms of the German welfare state. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the underlying con-
ceptional framework is expounded. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics of the data used 
and introduces the econometric models. The empirical analysis is presented and discussed in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
2 Methods  
2.1 Conceptional framework  
For experimentally measuring preferences in the economic sense, we apply a DCE. The ex-
perimental approach can be justified in view of the fact that redistribution of income is a non-
marketable good, the preferences for which are hardly ever revealed by citizens. In most de-
mocracies, all they can do is vote for or against a party that promises to increase the amount 
                                                 
8 Boeri et al. (2001; 2002) stands out, as they try to overcome these problems using the Contingent Valuation 
Method (CVM). Their analyses focus on the attitudes towards redistribution with regard to pension schemes and 
unemployment insurance. Their approach does impose a trade-off between social insurance coverage and income 
net of contributions. However, CVM holds all attributes of the product “pension reform” constant, only varying 
its price. In contrast, all attributes are varied in a DCE, resulting in trade-offs between all of them. 
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of redistribution. In a situation where preferences are not revealed, stated preferences (SP) 
may serve as second best. If measured correctly, they can predict individuals’ decision mak-
ing by revealing existing but not articulated preferences (see Louviere and Street 2000, 
pp. 22–25). The DCE method, developed by Louviere and Woodworth (1983) as well as Lou-
viere and Hensher (1982) is rooted in decision theory and microeconomic utility theory in the 
version of Lancaster (1966).9 Individuals derive their utility not from the good per se but from 
the characteristics (the so called attributes) offered by the product.10 Utility maximization im-
plies that respondents taking part in the experiment can opt for only one of the goods or op-
tions presented instead of maximizing utility over a bundle of goods. In the classical version 
of a DCE, participants are asked to repeatedly choose between a fixed status quo and a hypo-
thetical alternative. These alternatives exhibit the same attributes but vary regarding the at-
tribute levels. In our case, the individuals are exposed to a number of pairwise decision situa-
tions in which the status quo is confronted with varying alternatives. We define the whole 
redistributive system as one good with specific attributes (the attributes will be described in 
detail below).  
In general terms, an individual i chooses alternative l rather than j if the utility derived from 
alternative l is higher than the utility derived from any other alternative j (see Ben-Akiva and 
Lermann 1985, p. 57; Louviere and Street 2000, p. 62), i.e. if 
[2.1]  
Equation [2.1] consists of the attributes vector bj and bl as well as the indicator for the attrib-
ute levels xj and xl of the respective alternative j and l (Lancaster 1971, pp. 21–24). Together 
with the conditional demand functions xj ( )  and xl ( )  one obtains the indirect utility function 
[2.2]  
Besides the price of the respective alternative pl (pj), the attributes bl (bj) and the individual’s 
income yi, also the socio-demographic characteristics si of individual i enter the indirect utility 
function. By including the price attribute, the individual budget constraint is imposed. 
The data obtained from a DCE allow to analyze the effect of individual attributes on the deci-
sion making process of the respondents.  
An important parameter reflecting the structure of preferences is the marginal rate of substitu-
tion (MRS). However, as indicated by microeconomic theory, the MRS depends on where it is 
evaluated along an indifference curve. For this reason, many DCEs fix a status quo as the 
baseline alternative, ensuring that comparisons of utilities refer to the same reference point. 
Otherwise the calculated welfare measures might be biased. Accordingly, a rational utility 
maximizing individual chooses a proposed alternative B if this alternative offers a higher utili-
ty than the status quo S. If at the same time the individual chooses status quo S rather than 
alternative A, the individual’s indifference curve must be located between A and B (see Pfarr 
                                                 
9 DCEs were first applied in marketing research, environment and transportation economics and since the middle 
of the 1990s also in health economics (see for example Bekker-Grob et al. 2012). 
10 This is the striking differences between traditional neoclassic utility theory and the demand theory of Lancas-
ter (1966). The Lancastrian approach is in line with the neoclassical view of utility with respect to the form and 
shape of the utility function. Furthermore, the axioms of transitivity, completeness, continuity and concavity also 
hold Lancaster 1971. 
( ; ) ( ; ).  il ij i l l i j jU U u x b u x b
( , , , ) ( , , , )  .    il ij l l l i i j j j i iV V v p b y s v p b y s j l
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2013, p. 112; Vroomen and Zweifel 2011, p. 89). Hence, repeated choices of this type permit 
to estimate the slope of the indifference curve, i.e. ,n mMRS  between attributes m and n (see 
Lancsar et al. 2007, p. 1741). By partially differentiating the indirect utility function11 the 
MRS is given by, 
[2.3]  
If nb  is specified as the price attribute, the MRS can be interpreted as marginal willingness to 
pay (MWTP).12 That is the MWTP of individual i for an additional unit of nb  expressed in 
units of the individual’s income. This measure of preferences will be applied in the empirical 
analysis. 
Individuals’ utility has to be treated as a latent construct that cannot be directly observed. 
Building on the Random Utility Theory (see McFadden 1974; 1981 and Manski 1977) an er-
ror term il  is added to the indirect utility function as not all attributes and motives can be 
observed or ex ante anticipated by the researcher. Splitting the utility function into a deter-
ministic observable ( )lw   and the stochastic component il , one obtains: 
[2.4]  
Consequently, only the probability ilP  of individual i choosing alternative l rather than j can 
be estimated (see Louviere and Street 2000, p. 53). This probability indicates individuals’ 
decision making and is in line to their preference for a given redistributive system expressed 
by choosing one of the proposed options. The options, i.e. status quo and one alternative, con-
stitute the possible supply of redistribution. Accordingly, by means of this experiment, the 
voting mechanism is captured through the DCE. Furthermore, with the incorporation of the 
price attribute pl which represents the personal contribution for a given redistributive system, 
the budget constraint is imposed. Thus, the experimental framework is able to cover the un-
derlying voting mechanism and to overcome the aforementioned shortcomings.  
2.2 Implementation and survey design 
Because of the hypothetical nature of the DCE its design requires special attention. Following 
Bateman et al. (2002, p. 258), the process included intensive literature reviews, expert inter-
views, and group discussions involving a total of 629 students as well as three independently 
conducted pretests with about 40 participants each.13 Ten attributes were found to affect indi-
viduals’ utility in the context of a redistribution system. These attributes are: personal tax and 
social insurance contributions14, the amount of redistribution as a percentage of the GDP, the 
socio-demographic status of beneficiaries (sick persons and persons in need of care, families 
                                                 
11 In this case a linear utility function is assumed. If a nonlinear utility function is considered, the calculation is 
analog. 
12 Using Roy’s Identity the price parameter can be interpreted as the marginal utility of income. For the formal 
proof see Hanemann (1983, p. 544) or Telser (2002, p. 56). 
13 For a detailed discussion and presentation of the experimental design please refer to Pfarr (2013). 
14 To simplify, averages for the personal income tax are chosen. The progressivity of the German income tax 
cannot be covered. If personal income tax would be individual specific – e.g. with respect to the progression – 
the econometrically required independency of attributes and individuals would fail. As this is a critical assump-
tion we test for this, e.g. by adjusting for income levels. 
     
ˆ( , , , )/ .ˆ( , , , )/
mm
n
n
l l l i i m bb
b l l l i i n b
v p b y s bMRS
v p b y s b


      ( , , , ) ( , , , )  .il ij l l l i i il j j j i i ijV V w p b y s w p b y s j l 
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with children, retirees, unemployed, working poor) as well as the nationality of recipients 
(German, West-European, other).  
Moreover, the attributes need to be assigned meaningful attribute levels. On the one hand, 
they should cover a relevant and realistic range. On the other hand, they need to be sufficient-
ly spaced to make respondents “jump” between the status quo and an alternative redistributive 
system. Without sufficient number of decisions in favor of alternatives, the shape of the indif-
ference curve cannot be estimated with any precision. Furthermore, pitting an increase in the 
level of one attribute against a decrease of another attribute forces respondents to face trade-
offs (cf. Bateman et al. 2002, p. 260; Telser 2002, p. 39). To give a succinct summary of the 
constructed redistributive systems, the attributes are grouped together and visualized in four 
diagrams which underline the substitutive character and the inherent trade-offs between the 
attributes (see appendix). Figure 1 presents the chosen attributes and their respective levels 
categorized by their substitutive relationships. Note that the spread in the price attribute (TC) 
is particularly marked; this is appropriate in view of the fact that an estimate of the coefficient 
pertaining to the price attribute is needed for the calculation of all MWTP values.   
 
Figure 1: Attributes, Labels and Levels 
Since the number of possible combinations would put an excessive burden on participants, it 
needs to be reduced. By using the software gosset to apply a D-optimal design (see Kanninen 
2002, Kuhfeld et al. 1994, Kuhfeld 2006)15, we were able to restrict the number of alterna-
tives to 49. We split these into seven groups16 and randomly assigned each respondent to one 
of them. For checking consistency of choices, we included one alternative twice meaning that 
at the end of the whole process the tasks per respondent dropped to eight.  
                                                 
15 While the D-optimality was developed essentially for linear estimation models, Carson et al. (1994) suggest 
that the application for non-linear models such as probit or logit is also possible. 
16 Bech et al. (2011) shows that the cognitive burden increases in the number of choice sets. Nevertheless, Bech 
et al. (2011) shows that exposing respondents up to 17 choice-sets is manageable and respondents can handle 
even such large numbers. 
personal tax and social insurance contribution
total amount of redistribution as percentage of GDP
socio-demographic status of beneficiaries
nationality of recipients
tax and contribution (TC)
redistribution (RE)
retirees (RI)
sick persons and persons in need of care (SP)
unemployed (UL)
families with children (FC)
working poor (WP)
German (DE)
West-Europeans (WE)
other (OT)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
alternative attribute levels status quo
Note: All attribute labels in Percent.
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Finally, to obtain unbiased estimates it is compulsory to ensure that all respondents have simi-
lar knowledge about the status quo. Consequently, respondents were provided with a compre-
hensive description of the current amount and structure of income redistribution in Germany, 
the choice process in the experiment, and the attributes and their possible realizations.17 In 
contrast to laboratory experiments, it is uncommon to use financial payoffs in DCEs that are 
administered in the field. This entails the risk of respondents overstating their true willingness 
to pay because they do not have to actually contribute to redistribution. However, recent liter-
ature indicates that willingness-to-pay estimates do not depend of whether or not payoffs are 
involved (see Mørkbak et al. 2012; Broadbent 2012). 
3 Empirical strategy  
3.1 Data 
The data was collected in February 2012 and is representative for the resident German popu-
lation eligible to vote. Since preferences of respondents from the former GDR were expected 
to differ systematically from those in the West, the GDR was oversampled to ensure suffi-
ciently large numbers; accordingly, descriptive statistics discussed below are weighted. In 
total, 1,538 individuals completed the DCE as well as the complementing questionnaire in 
computer-assisted interviews. 
With eight decision tasks, the full dataset comprises 12,304 observations.18 The consistency 
check reveals that 13 percent of respondents failed to choose identically in two identical sce-
narios. This is a fairly low number compared to other DCE studies (cf. Phillips et al. 2002), 
suggesting that the DCE was well explained to participants. Often, these individuals are ex-
cluded from the analysis on the grounds that they behaved in an inconsistent way. However, 
by retaining them, one is prevented from overestimating the accuracy of results and hence 
from excessive confidence in forecasting actual decisions. Moreover, results prove robust 
against the inclusion of inconsistent responses (see Pfarr 2013). In addition, Lancsar and Lou-
viere (2006) argue that random utility theory is designed to accommodate errors in decision 
making. 
Of the 1,538 respondents, 86 were not yet born in 1989, the year of reunification, while 42 
were living outside Germany. This leaves 1,410 individuals, of whom 428 (identified by the 
indicator variable East German =1) have lived in the GDR under Communism and of whom 
982 have lived in West Germany prior to 1989.19 In addition, 30 individuals (some 7 percent 
of the GDR subsample) have migrated to the West between 1989 and 2012. Using weights to 
adjust for the oversampling this indicates that by 2012 about 11 percent of the former citizens 
of the GDR have moved to the territory of West Germany. This is an increase of about 4 per-
centage points compared to the 7 % Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) report for the period 
between 1989 and 2002. Migration from the west to the east has also happened, but only on a 
much smaller scale: less than 3 percent of the West Germans have moved to the former GDR. 
While this is almost five times the number observed in 2002, this is still on a very low level. 
                                                 
17 More information is available upon request.  
18 This results in the panel structure with eight periods as described above. 
19 The weighted proportion of East Germans in our sample is about 22 % which is reasonably close to the num-
bers of the Federal Statistical Office which states a proportion of 20 % (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012). 
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The variable inequality reduction captures answers to the statement, ‘It is the responsibility of 
the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and 
those with low incomes by collecting taxes and granting money transfers’ in the complemen-
tary questionnaire. The scale ranged from 1= ‘totally agree’, 2= ‘agree’ and 3 =“disagree’ on 
to 4= ‘totally disagree’, with ‘cannot say’ also admissible. As shown in table 1, East Germans 
exhibit a significantly higher degree of agreement, but differences in mean values are small. 
Yet mean values hide considerable heterogeneity within the two subsamples, as evidenced by 
figure 2. While only 36 percent of West Germans totally agree, this share is 51 percent among 
East Germans. Thus, while both groups share the conviction that government has the respon-
sibility to reduce income differences, their attitudes differ substantially in detail.  
 
Figure 2: Attitudes towards the welfare state for East and West Germans 
The indicator variable choice is the dependent variable in the analysis of the DCE; it equals 
one if the respondent opted for the alternative instead of staying with the status quo. A mean 
value choice = 0.35 is high compared to other DCEs (see Neustadt 2011; Becker 2006), giv-
ing rise to the expectation that the MRS and WTP values of interest can be estimated with 
sufficient precision. Only about 8 percent of respondents never chose the alternative, whereas 
the modal number of moving away from the status quo is three, with no difference between 
East and West Germans. 
This is slightly different when it comes to the age structure of the sample. While the catego-
ries age1, age3 and age4 do not exhibit significant differences, young people (age5) are more 
strongly represented among the East Germans and the senior age group (age2), among the 
West Germans. This carries over to a significantly higher average age in the West German 
subsample. Significant differences show also in the case of marital status, divorce, education 
level, and employment and are in accordance with official statistics. Most notably, incomes 
are significantly higher in the West than in the East amounting to a difference of almost 
360 Euro in monthly household income on average. 
  
35.9
47.1
9.0
3.6 4.4
50.7
37.8
7.1
2.1 2.3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
in 
Pe
rce
nt
West Germans East Germans
Note: Data of the Sample are weighted.
totally agree agree disagree
totally disagree cannot say
It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with
high incomes and those with low incomes by collecting taxes and granting monetary transfers
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
West Germans 
 
East Germans 
 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Dependent Variables     
Inequality reduction 1.80 0.72 1.60 0.72 
Choice 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48 
Basis variables     
Age1 (< 1935) 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16 
Age2 (1935 – 1949) 0.25 0.44 0.22 0.42 
Age3 (1950 – 1964) 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47 
Age4 (1965 – 1979) 0.26 0.44 0.33 0.47 
Age5 (> 1980) 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.38 
Socioeconomic controls     
Female 0.51 0.50 0.54 0.50 
Age 52.11 15.28 50.08 15.36 
Age_sq/100 29.48 16.14 27.43 15.64 
Married 0.59 0.49 0.52 0.50 
Widowed 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 
Divorced 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.36 
Number of children 1.32 1.12 1.29 1.10 
Secondary school 0.27 0.44 0.39 0.49 
Vocational training 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.42 
A level graduation 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 
University diploma 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 
Fulltime employed 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.50 
Log (net monthly equivalent   
 household income) 
7.39 0.54 7.14 0.53 
N 982  428  
Note: Data are weighted. 
 
3.2 Estimation strategy  
The first part of the empirical investigation – following Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) 
and others – focuses on attitudes towards the welfare state. A simple ordered probit model is 
specified with the aim to analyze the effects of Communism on individuals’ attitudes. The 
variable inequality reduction is a four-point categorical variable. According to the latent vari-
able approach Boes and Winkelmann (2006), the econometric equation for the ordered re-
sponse models reads: 
[3.1] 1 2 .    i i iinequality reduction communism controls  
In the ordered probit models it is common to assume a constant unitary variance of one, since 
the mean of the latent variable inequality reduction is not identified (see Long 1997). Thus, 
for the purpose of identification the constant has to be set to zero. Moreover, the error term i  
is assumed to have variance of one as well Boes and Winkelmann 2006). The variable com-
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munism is proxied by two indicators, both indicating East German origin that will be dis-
cussed in the results section.  
In the second part the objective is to capture preferences using a DCE to estimate respond-
ents’ WTP for redistribution. As their utility is a latent construct, only the probability ilP  of 
individual i choosing alternative l rather than j can be estimated, 
 
[3.2]  
 
    
         
   
( | ) Pr[ ( ) ( )]   l,j C ;  
                ( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( )
il
il m ij il l j m
ij il l l l i i j j j i i il il
P l C w w j l
w p b y s w p b y s d  
with il ij ilφ ε ε   and ϕ(⋅) denoting the pdf. 
This probability thus equals the probability that the differences between the error terms  
( ij il ) are dominated by the differences in the deterministic component ( ( ) ( )  l jw w ) 
(see Louviere and Street 2000, p. 40; Train 2009, p. 15). Assuming the error terms of eq. [3.2] 
to be normally distributed with a mean vector of zero and covariance matrix Ω (Cameron and 
Trivedi 2008, pp. 947–951; Train 2009, p. 97), leads to the binary probit model with a two-
way random effects specification reflecting the fact that the same respondents make repeated 
choices. To overcome the restrictive assumptions of a constant marginal utility associated 
with an additive linear specification of the indirect utility function (see Pekelman and Sen 
1979; Gegax and Stanley 1997), we use a quadratic specification.20 The estimation equation 
[3.3] below includes such quadratic terms for the attributes tax and contribution (TC), redis-
tribution (RE) and other nationalities (OT) to allow for a non-constant MRS.21 For the econ-
ometric specification we have to bear in mind that each of the two groups of beneficiaries add 
up to 100 %. The attributes sick persons and persons in need of care and Germans are the 
omitted reference category to avoid perfect collinearity. 
With respect to eq. [3.2], individual’s decision making is only determined by the utility dif-
ferences in the deterministic component. Consequently, socio-demographic characteristics 
will drop out of the calculation of the marginal willingness to pay as they are constant be-
tween the several decisions. Thus the variable communism enters the estimation equation in 
the guise of an interaction with ΔTC, ΔTC², ΔRE, and ΔRE² to allow for a difference of MRS 
between respondents with and without a communist background (see Boxall and Adamowicz 
2002, p. 421; Johnson and Desvousges 1997, p. 83), 
                                                 
 
21 We run several specification tests and procedures (e.g. Forward-Selection and Backward-Elimination proce-
dure; Ramsey RESET test, Likelihood Ratio test). At the end, our tests pointed to the presented model to be the 
best with respect to goodness of fit. More information is available from the authors upon request.  
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[3.3]  
with 0 0 0   l j and the δs representing parameters to be estimated.  
4 Results  
4.1 Attitudes towards the welfare state 
Table 2 presents the results for the ordered probit models designed to analyze attitudes to-
wards the welfare state for East and West Germans, with inequality reduction the dependent 
variable. Estimates (1) and (2) show the effect of being an East German versus being a West 
German (reference category).  
Table 2: Results of ordered probit models for inequality reduction
 inequality reduction 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE 
East German -0.298 (0.068) ***  -0.227 (0.076) ***        
East living in East        -0.320 (0.071) ***  -0.245 (0.080) *** 
East living in West        -0.034 (0.200)   -0.012 (0.197)  
                
Socioeconomic 
controls 
    yes       yes   
AIC 2,843.55   2,416.04  2,843.75   2,416.96  
BIC 2,864.40   2,502.13  2,869.82   2,508.11  
N  1,358    1,169   1,358    1,169  
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
In line with the literature discussed in Section 1, East Germans are more inclined to strongly 
agree with the statement that it is the responsibility of the government to reduce income dif-
ferences (recall that the value 1 means ‘strongly agree’). This difference is highly significant, 
suggesting that almost 22 years after reunification the two groups still differ in their percep-
tion of the role of the state when it comes to income redistribution, thereby confirming the 
previous results of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), Corneo and Grüner (2002) and 
Kuhn (2013). However, this finding also contradicts the predictions of Alesina and Fuchs-
Schündeln (2007), who hypothesize that attitudes are converging, forecasting the year 2009 as 
a lower bound for convergence. Possibly, their prediction is not borne out because it is based 
on an extrapolation of only two time periods. Summarizing, estimates (1) and (2) point to atti-
tudes being a long lasting characteristic, confirming previous findings. 
Estimates (3) and (4) of table 2 deal with the effect of migration. Having moved to a West 
German neighborhood since reunification could have fostered convergence compared to the 

   
   
  

    
       
       
  
 0
2 2
2 2
1
Pr [ 1| ]
( * ) ( * )
( * ) ( * )
[ ]
ilj i il m
p pc i pp ppc i
r rc i rr rrc i
K
k k s i il
k
V choice C
TC TC communism TC TC communism
RE RE communism RE RE communism
b controls
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ones who stayed in the East; however, individuals who migrated to the West could constitute 
a self-selected group with attitudes closer to those of the West Germans from the outset. This 
is also discussed by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) offering an explanation for the di-
verging convergence paths of these two East German groups. Most of the convergence be-
tween East Germans and West Germans between 1997 and 2002 seems to be driven by the 
East Germans who stayed in the East. So the migrants either were different from the outset or 
had already achieved their final level of convergence in 1997. By pitting East living in West 
against East living in East, one can control for this type of selection effect.22 The first variable 
being defined as individuals who have migrated to the West since reunification and the sec-
ond variable being defined as East Germans who have stayed on the territory of the former 
GDR after reunification. West Germans continue to constitute the reference group. The de-
scriptive statistics for the subsamples are presented in table A.1 in the appendix. Both esti-
mates point to a persisting effect of Communism since East Germans who stayed in the East 
exhibit a stronger agreement with governmental interventions and therefor a higher attitude 
towards redistribution. Coefficients in estimates (3) and (4) are somewhat higher than those 
pertaining to East Germans in estimates (1) and (2) of table 2. Thus, when both groups are 
summarized as East Germans, the effect of East Germans still living in the East is diluted by 
East Germans living in the West.  
The influence of living conditions is epitomized by East living in West, whose coefficient 
fails to reach statistical significance. Attitudes of those from the East who moved to the West 
do not seem to differ from their West German neighbors anymore, indicating complete con-
vergence. This finding again contradicts Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), who conclude 
that movers exhibit stronger attitudes for redistribution than West Germans. Moreover the 
results do not change when we include individual control variables for example for education 
or income. Due to these results, the following analysis will rely on East living in East as a 
proxy for Communism using West Germans as reference category. 
The persistence of the effects from living under a Communist regime can be analyzed further 
by introducing age as an intervening variable. This variable reflects the amount of time spent 
under this regime. One would hypothesize that the longer somebody has been exposed to the 
Communist ideology – i.e. the older an individual is – the longer lasting are the effects of 
Communism on his attitudes. We define five age cohorts using the youngest individuals 
(age5) as the reference category. As can be seen from table 3, the effect of having remained in 
the East remains prevalent and significant, no matter whether socio-demographic controls are 
included [estimate (2)] or not [estimate (1)]. 
  
                                                 
22 To achieve comparability with the results presented by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), West Germans 
and West Germans who have moved to the former GDR have been merged. In another estimate, West Germans 
who migrated to the East were excluded, without any relevant differences. Results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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Table 3: Results of ordered probit models for inequality reduction, by age cohorts 
 inequality reduction 
 (1)  (2) 
 Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE 
East living in East -0.425 (0.186) **  -0.388 (0,203) ** 
Age1 * East living in East  (highest age) -0.273 (0.415)   -0.279 (0,434)  
Age2 * East living in East -0.096 (0.239)   -0.033 (0,257)  
Age3 * East living in East 0.258 (0.223)   0.377 (0,243)  
Age4 * East living in East 0.184 (0.228)   0.162 (0,247)  
Age1 (highest age) 0.229 (0.227)   0.291 (0,250)  
Age2 -0.070 (0.113)   -0.136 (0,148)  
Age3 -0.034 (0.108)   -0.177 (0,130)  
Age4 -0.015 (0.114)   -0.057 (0,130)  
        
Socioeconomic 
controls     yes   
AIC 2,848.66   2,416.66  
BIC 2,911.23   2,533.13  
N  1,358    1,169  
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
However, neither for East Germans living in the East nor the benchmark group (West Ger-
mans) we find any significant age effects, once more contradicting Alesina and Fuchs-
Schündeln (2007). They find that West Germans are less inclined to emphasize the responsi-
bility of the government the older they are, opposite to the East Germans. Their evidence sug-
gests a strong relationship between the amount of time spent under Communist rule and the 
attitude towards redistribution. However, using a cross-country panel, Olivera (2012) does 
identify an age effect, i.e. older age cohorts exhibiting stronger support for redistribution than 
younger ones, independently of whether the country has a Communist past or not. The study 
by Kuhn (2013) concludes that across all age cohorts, East Germans exhibit a higher inclina-
tion towards redistribution. But the differences between the age cohorts are small and no lev-
els of significance are given. Thus our results contribute yet another flavor to a very heteroge-
neous literature. One could argue that the by now relatively long time period since the end of 
the Communist regime overshadows the effects that were still visible in 1997 and 2002 – 
pointing again towards potential convergence.  
Summarizing, we do find relevant differences between East Germans who stayed in the East 
and those who migrated to the West. While the latter group has completely converged with 
West Germans, we still find significant differences of considerable extent between East Ger-
mans who stayed in the East and West Germans. However, as we still find the mentioned dif-
ferences this seems to be a very slow process, underlining the long persistence of attitudes 
shaped under Communism. But special circumstances – e.g. having migrated and thus being 
strongly exposed to West German influences – accelerate convergence. This proves that con-
vergence does happen and that its speed depends on the prevalent circumstances. Finally, we 
can disregard the explanation that the group of East Germans who have migrated has devel-
oped differently compared to the rest only due to self-selection. 
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4.2 Willingness to pay for redistribution 
As argued above, measured attitudes are prone to misinterpretation because they do not take 
into account trade-offs imposed by a budget constraint. Therefore, citizens’ willingness to pay 
for redistribution is the preferred measure for informing policy. The DCE solves these short-
comings and expresses preferences in terms of willingness to pay. MWTP values are calculat-
ed by first estimating equation [3.3] applying a random effects specification.  
This permits calculation of the partial derivatives with respect to the attributes ΔRE and ΔTC 
according to equation [2.3], evaluating them at the status quo values, i.e. 0RE TC    , 
which also causes the quadratic terms to drop out of the equation. Neglecting socio-economic 
control variables at this point, the equation [2.4] can be applied immediately, yielding   
[4.1]  
The overall result for the whole German population is presented as estimate (1) in table 4. 
Thus German citizens are willing to pay an extra 0.564 percentage point of their monthly 
gross income for an additional percentage point of GDP devoted to redistribution in excess of 
the status quo. Hence, German citizens exhibit a strong preference for redistribution even 
when they are made aware of the fact that they have to sacrifice some of their own income in 
order to finance it. 
For the analysis of the effects of Communism, the proxy East living in East has to be interact-
ed with the linear and quadratic terms of the two attributes of interest, i.e. TC (tax and contri-
butions) and RE (redistribution). Thus, the calculation of the MWTP has to be extended to 
also include the partial derivatives pertaining to the interaction terms, evaluated at com-
munism = 1 and communism = 0,  
[4.2]  
Therefore, East Germans living in the East exhibit a MWTP of 0.587 percentage points of 
their monthly gross income for an increase of redistribution by one percentage point of GDP; 
however, the standard errors are too large to make the difference with the German average 
value of 0.564 statistically significant.23 As for the reference category West German, the cal-
culation of the MWTP reduces to  r /p  = 0.561, which is lower than that of the East Ger-
mans but again not significantly so. This result is surprising at first sight as attitudes for redis-
tribution strongly differ between the two groups; however, this will be discussed in section 
4.3. While attitudes for redistribution are significantly stronger for East Germans living in the 
East, preferences for redistribution seem to be equal. 
  
                                                 
23 Standard errors are estimated using the delta method (Hole 2007). 

   
           0; 0
( )/ 0.0321 0.564( )/ 0.0569
ilj rRE
TC
ilj pTC RE
V REMWTP
V TC
 
    
          
  
0; 0
( )/
( )/
0,0311 0,0034 0.5870,0554 0,0033
ilj r rcRE
TC
ilj p pcTC RE
V REMWTP
V TC
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Table 4: Marginal willingness to pay for redistribution 
 choice 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 MWTP  SE  MWTP SE  MWTP SE  MWTP SE  
Germans 0.565 (0.034) ***          
East living in East    0.587 (0.063) *** 0.558 (0.066) ***    
West Germans    0.561 (0.043) *** 0.602 (0.047) ***    
Age1 * East          0.587 (0.285) ** 
Age1 * West          0.638 (0.296) ** 
Age2 * East          1.048 (0.121) *** 
Age2 * West          1.120 (0.110) *** 
Age3 * East          0.550 (0.080) *** 
Age3 * West          0.581 (0.068) *** 
Age4 * East          0.405 (0.084) *** 
Age4 * West          0.429 (0.073) *** 
Age5 * East          0.317 (0.098) *** 
Age5 * West          0.337 (0.092) *** 
Socioeconomic  
controls   
 
 
  yes   yes   
N 12,304  11,280  9,616  9,616  
LL -7,078  -6,866  -5,822  -5,441  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors were calculated using the delta method. 
 
Estimate (3) incorporates the full list of control variables including income. Since incomes in 
the East continue to be lower than in the West, this might explain equality of MWTP values in 
the face of strongly divergent attitudes. However, even when accounting for income East and 
West Germans fail to exhibit a statistically significant difference in their MWTP for redistri-
bution in excess of the status quo, at least in the year 2012. There may have been an effect 
some years ago, but obviously attitudes towards redistribution and preferences for redistribu-
tion are not the same. 
Finally, estimate (4) controls for age effects, in analogy to section 4.1. Interestingly, there are 
no significant differences between the MWTPs of East and West Germans within a given age 
group. However, age cohorts do differ with respect to their MWTP in both groups. For exam-
ple, across the country, the oldest (age1) have a significantly lower MWTP for redistribution 
than age group 2 but do not differ significantly from the others. 
While in this paper a sharp distinction has been made between attitudes and preferences in the 
economic sense, this does not imply that attitudes are void of information for explaining pref-
erences. Therefore, the observed variable inequality reduction from Section 4.1 is now added 
to equation [3.3], with the two categories disagree and totally disagree (which were rarely 
chosen by respondents, see figure 2) merged into the variable disagree. This reflects a first 
hypothesis, stating that attitudes, while not equivalent to MWTP values, do matter in predict-
ing them. In addition, the remaining three categories (totally agree, agree, and disagree) are 
interacted with East living in East, reflecting a second hypothesis, according to which atti-
tudes favoring government intervention should result in an even higher MWTP for redistribu-
tion among East Germans (who were exposed to communist ideology) than among West 
Germans. 
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This first hypothesis is borne out in table 5, in that MWTP is lowest among those (regardless 
of where they live) who are against the government intervening with the aim to reduce in-
come inequality. The difference between their MWTP value and of those respondents (strong-
ly) in favor of government intervention is statistically significant. However, the second hy-
pothesis is not confirmed. East Germans who support or strongly support this type of gov-
ernment intervention fail to exhibit higher MWTP values than West Germans of the same 
conviction. Therefore, while attitudes towards redistribution are connected with preferences 
for redistribution, they do not boost MWTP in Eastern Germany, the part of the country 
where measured attitudes are particularly pro-redistribution. 
Table 5: Marginal willingness to pay for redistribution, by attitudes 
 MWTP SE  
East: Strongly agree with inequality reduction 0.659  (0.077) *** 
West: Strongly agree with inequality reduction 0.757  (0.071) *** 
East: Agree with inequality reduction 0.514  (0.079) *** 
West: Agree with inequality reduction 0.596  (0.061) *** 
East: Disagree with inequality reduction 0.199  (0.128)  
West: Disagree with  inequality reduction 0.258  (0.121) ** 
Socioeconomic controls yes   
N 9,352  
LL -5,318  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors were calculated using the delta method. 
 
In sum, no statistically significant differences between East and West Germans can be found 
in MWTP values for income redistribution, regardless of whether attitudes and socioeconomic 
characteristics are controlled for or not. This contradicts previous findings that East German 
attitudes are more in favor of redistribution than their Western counterparts. 
4.3 Discussion and limitations 
As stated in the Introduction section, the aim of this study is twofold. First, it seeks to test 
whether attitudes towards the welfare state continue to differ between West and East Ger-
mans, who were exposed to communist culture and ideology until 1989. We do so by apply-
ing established survey questions and find that differences still persist, implying a lower rate of 
convergence than suggested in previous research.  
The second objective is to go beyond attitudes by measuring actual preferences for redistribu-
tion in the economic sense. Up to now basically all of the mentioned studies that rely on data 
obtained from voiced agreement on certain statements use the term preferences to describe 
what their results represent. We argue that this is a simplification that creates ambiguity: This 
approach allows to draw conclusions about what we call attitudes, but not about preferences. 
Figure 3 helps to illustrate the difference. To allow for a two-dimensional graph we use a 
simplified setting of a redistributive scenario that is characterized by only two attributes, i.e. 
the total volume of redistribution and the price attribute. For a meaningful interpretation, the 
latter is depicted as the difference between the individual’s income and the price attribute. The 
status quo SQ is defined by a certain amount of redistribution and a defined price that is real-
ized by tax and social insurance contributions. According to microeconomic theory, individu-
als will always choose a product that maximizes their utility. This means, the characteristics 
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To be able to derive policy recommendations, the MWTP estimates still have to be confronted 
with overall budget constraints. We can test whether the MWTP of the employees – i.e. those 
who constitute the major group of tax payers – is sufficient to achieve a balanced household 
budget. Given the current redistribution budget of 760 billion euros in Germany, an additional 
percentage point of GDP devoted to redistribution translates (ceteris paribus) into 7.6 billion 
euros that need to be financed (see BMAS 2011). The findings presented above imply that 
German citizens25 are willing to give up 0.565 percentage points of their gross income or 
(evaluated at the mean of the monthly gross income of the employees in Germany) 12.27 eu-
ros per month in return for an additional percentage point of redistribution. Multiplying this 
figure with 36 million, the number of workers (see Statistisches Bundesamt 2011), and with 
12 for an annual amount, one obtains an aggregate WTP of 5.3 billion euros. To this, add the 
contributions of retirees (who also account, as these pay social insurance contributions and 
income taxes). Evaluated at their average gross pension, this is another 1.6 billion euros.26 
Altogether, the German electorate is estimated to be prepared to voluntarily contribute about 
6.9 billion euros to finance an increase of income redistribution by one percentage point of 
GDP. This leaves a gap of 0.7 billion euros per year, suggesting that while German citizens’ 
exhibit a marked willingness to pay for redistribution, it is not sufficient to finance a further 
increase beyond the status quo, unless alternative funding sources are utilized. 
At this point, it is important to stress that the desired level of redistribution does not necessari-
ly imply that this increase should be undertaken. For instance, it is doubtful that respondents 
to the DCE took into account the negative side effects emanating from higher taxes and con-
tributions in terms of e.g. incentives to work and save. Still, the results of this DCE contain 
important information for German policy makers. When proposing additional income redis-
tribution, they can be sure to be applauded by citizens across the country, but even more by 
the East Germans, as this is in line with the attitudes of the population. Politicians who pre-
sent the costs of such reforms will still find support, but only within the limits of citizens’ 
preferences, depicted by their MWTP. But as soon as the cost of such reform falling on tax-
payers and contributors to social insurance goes beyond their willingness to contribute, politi-
cians are likely to be penalized in elections. From a more optimistic perspective, telling citi-
zens the truth about costs to be borne in future may help to avoid failure by dampening expec-
tations. 
These statements are subject to several limitations. First, the hypothetical nature of the exper-
iment might produce biased results since respondents do not have to actually have to bear the 
financial consequences of their choices, making them overestimate their true MWTP for in-
come redistribution. Yet, there are several studies suggesting that the results derived from an 
experiment providing financial incentives do not differ significantly from those derived from 
an experiment without such incentives (see for example Mørkbak et al. 2012; Broadbent 
2012). Moreover, neither the comparable study by Neustadt (2011) for Switzerland nor validi-
ty checks performed in the context of the present study are able to identify significant distor-
tions (for more detail see Pfarr 2013). Second, an experiment always captures the sentiment at 
                                                 
25 As the MWTP does not differ between East and West Germans we do not need to calculate these values sepa-
rately. 
26 With a total of 16.5 million retirees in Germany (see Deutsche Rentenversicherung 2012). More information 
regarding the calculation is available in Pfarr (2013). 
 21 
a specific point of time. In this study, respondents might have been influenced by the Europe-
an debt crisis, which still dominated the public debate in February 2012. Finally, only the ef-
fects of Communism were investigated as determinants of the MWTP for redistribution in this 
paper. Of course, other determinants such as behavioral factors (risk aversion, altruism, fair-
ness) or economic self-interest (insurance motivation, Meltzer-Richard model, POUM hy-
pothesis) have been argued to influence the demand for income redistribution. While there is 
some evidence regarding the role of economic factors in Germany (Pfarr 2012), behavioral 
influences warrant further research. 
5 Concluding remarks 
To sum up, this study aims at contributing to the existing literature in two points. First, more 
than 22 years after the German reunification, the paper investigates the effects of Communism 
on individuals’ attitudes and preferences towards redistribution in Germany. Second, by ap-
plying a discrete choice experiment the paper aims at mitigating methodological shortcomings 
of standard studies that attempt to capture preferences. By doing so, we are able to measure 
true preferences rather than pure attitudes for redistribution. In the first part of the empirical 
analysis, we use data from a representative survey of the year 2012 using the standard econo-
metric models to relate our results to those of the existing literature regarding attitudes to-
wards redistribution. In the second part, we base our analyses on the same representative 
sample complemented by data from a DCE. We are able to calculate marginal willingness to 
pay for redistribution and to test whether attitudes towards the welfare state and preferences 
in terms of willingness to pay coincide.  
We find strong effects of Communism on individuals’ attitudes towards redistribution. Ac-
cordingly, East Germans – regardless of the classification – still tend to be more inclined to-
wards governmental interventions and show stronger support for redistribution. The effects of 
Communism on attitudes still persist and convergence has not yet been achieved. However, 
especially the East Germans who have migrated to the West provide support for the hypothe-
sis that convergence takes place. The results of the DCE find no significant differences be-
tween East and West Germans with respect to their willingness to pay for redistribution, even 
if other factors such as age or income effects are taken into account, thereby contradicting 
previous evidence. 
Summarizing, these findings underline that attitudes and preferences do not necessarily coin-
cide and should not be confused. Micro-economic theory, the empirical results and intuition 
support this standpoint. While citizens may voice interest in very high levels of redistribution, 
at some point – especially when taking trade-offs and budget constraints into account – we all 
have to realize that you can’t always get what you want. 
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics 
 West Germans & East living in West 
East Germans  
living in East 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Dependent Variables    
Inequality reduction 1.79 0.76 1.58 0.72 
Choice 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48 
Basis variables    
Age1 (< 1935) 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.16 
Age2 (1935 – 1949) 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 
Age3 (1950 – 1964) 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 
Age4 (1965 – 1979) 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 
Age5 (> 1980) 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.38 
Socioeconomic controls    
Female 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 
Age 52.01 15.23 50.23 15.59 
Age_sq/100 29.36 16.07 27.64 15.91 
Married 0.59 0.49 0.52 0.50 
Widowed 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.25 
Divorced 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 
Number of children 1.32 1.12 1.26 1.09 
Secondary school 0.27 0.45 0.38 0.49 
Vocational training 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41 
A level graduation 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 
University diploma 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 
Fulltime employed 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.50 
Log (net monthly equivalent   
 household income) 7.39 0.54 7.12 0.53 
N 1012  398  
Note: Data are weighted. 
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